MOST SECRET

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Ulius L. Amoss

DATE January 28, 1942

TO: Mr. David Bruce

SUBJECT: Notes on Communications with Greece

It is here suggested that communications with Greece be divided into three steps:

I. Immediate contact

It is possible for us to have almost immediate contact with Greece, to receive general information and to have specific questions answered.

We are able to use the facilities of the Greek Government in London in complete secrecy. The Greek Minister of Mercantile Marine, Stavros Theofanides, is the personal confidential deputy of both the King and the Prime Minister. He has the right to speak in their names and to commit them. Theofanides has been a confirmed and ardent friend of the United States for more than twenty years. He has been my personal friend for twenty years. I have seen him under severe tests, and I feel able to take responsibility for his discretion and loyalty. The Prime Minister, Emannuel Tsouderos is tight-lipped, friendly toward this country and an

acquaintance of mine. He reserves to himself alone all of the Greek intelligence services. He has current two-way communication with Greece, with such leaders as General Gonatas, his secret deputy in Greece, with Commodore Constantine Melas (father of our Leon Melas); and with agents posted throughout the occupied territories. His communications are independent of British intelligence channels. It is this service we can use without the knowledge of anyone except Theofanides and the Prime Minister.

Leon Melas' cousin in Istanbul is a "letter drop." We can use him without any other person knowing it.

I therefore recommend:

1. That Theofanides write in secrecy to the Prime Minister asking for all data in which he thinks we would be interested. That letter should be carried to London by a completely trusted person, preferably one of our own staff. Answers should be transmitted completely by American-protected means. They should not come by British diplomatic pouch.

2. A letter, already prepared by [Leon Melas, should be sent to Istanbul by our own man, who will be indicated as the one to whom Melas' cousin is to deliver his communications.]

II. Cover

[It is here suggested that my own export company in New York, or another similar cover be used as the front for such American Greeks as we may wish to introduce in Istanbul or in other exposed centers. Company bills of lading could be used for some shipments, if necessary.]

III. Initial organization

It is suggested that, initially, this activity be manned by a qualified person with one, perhaps two native Greek assistants, one Greek-American personnel man and one Greek-American agent. Expansion would depend upon requirements in the light of the discussion that follows this introduction and modified by other facts.

IV. Purposes

1. To insure accurate and quick exchange of information between Washington and occupied Greece.
2. To provide tangible proof of American interest in Greece, and encouragement and stimulus to the Greek will make for continued resistance.
3. To provide for:
   a. passive resistance
   b. sabotage and demolition
   c. coordination and expansion of the irregular

bands and "armies" formed and forming in the Greek hills and back country.

V. Scope

The scope of the operation, naturally, will depend upon the wishes of our commanders in the light of the programs they may have or will undertake. Suggestions made later in this sketch will include a maximum scope that can be reduced to any desired compass.

VI. Bases

Indicated centers are:

1. Alexandria
2. Derna--if the Libyan front is stabilized
3. Beirut
4. Istanbul

VII. Problems

1. Greek islands flanking the Asia Minor Turkish coast are heavily occupied and armed.
2. The Peleponneseus is sealed by Germany.
3. Turkish minor officials may be troublesome and won't stay "bought."
4. Distances are great for sail; powered fishing boats are subject to questioning as to the source of their fuel supply.
5. Many individual Greeks may have been "bought."

6. Marine communication has to pass well-controlled zones.

7. All populated areas are heavily garrisoned.

8. Similar problems confront infiltration by way of Thrace.

9. The future status of Turkey remains in doubt.

10. Our reports indicate that Axis troops are increasing in number in Greece; this presupposes additional defense and means of defense.

11. Enemy land based aerial patrol. Enemy marine patrol, (fortunately largely using fishing vessels).

12. Possible jealousy of persons who learn of distribution of some foodstuffs to others.

VIII. Advantages

1. The coast and the isles are too extensive to be fully guarded.

2. The interior is wild and much is untouched by enemy forces.

3. The Greek has a tradition of guerrilla fighting and a special aptitude and fortitude for infiltration and secret work.

4. We believe we can secure the services of trained radio men in Greece--men known to and trusted by us.

5. Existence in the United States of numbers of competent Greek seamen and tough-going Greek-Americans.

6. Possibility of a safe echelon-cadence schedule in hops by night from island to island.

7. Severe jealousies between German and Italian occupying forces. Italians control Ionian sea zones where they convoy their supplies. (Replacements and materiel are shipped via Brindisi, Bari, and Taranto to the Gulf of Preveza where they are fed into Greece by means of the Jannina-Agrinion-Athens and Preveza-Jannina-Karditsa highways. Supplies for Attica and for the Dodecannese are shipped to the Gulf of Corinth and unloaded at Itea for Athens via Delphi-Thebes-Malakassa-Menidi or unloaded at Loutraki for Athens or Piraeus.) Since the Germans apparently believe the Allies are not prepared for a Greek invasion from the West and since the lax Italians are guarding this sector, it is believed that these areas are highly approachable, especially after careful study of the cadence of Italian convoy schedules and patrols. The region north of Preveza is wild and desolate and does not have important roads. In this region the Greek guerrillas are strong. In this sector ridges and ravines run from north to south and virtually no rivers exist, and the streams that do are easily crossed at any point, thus avoiding the necessary traversing of guarded bridges. The coves and small inlets are too numerous to be properly guarded. NOTE: Submarine contact is indicated for this region. Aerial landings could be made on Lake Janinna or Lake Prespa with small danger--or landings could be made off shore.

IX. Tactical notes

Agents should be given specific objectives, receive thorough instruction as to the methods of approach.

X. Objectives

1. Advise guerrillas that assistance is being prepared.
2. Proof should be forthcoming in the shape of arms, food and drugs.

3. Establish in each guerrilla band a contact officer who receives suggestions and reports information as to disposition of enemy units, etc.

4. Establish several radio communications centers, taking care to provide for changes of frequencies.

NOTE: Operations may have increasing or decreased military importance, and are of great political value in the eventual and growing reaction on the Greek people. A whispering campaign can spread like wildfire in Greece, and misinformation can be gotten to the enemy.

XI. Cautions

Extended operations should not be abortive. They should be timed and in mesh with larger strategy, or else enemy precautions will be increased too soon and valuable material will be wasted.

XII. Coordination and Diversion

When operations are properly organized, irregulars can divert enemy attention from agents' landing points.

NOTES ON THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF THE GREEK PENINSULA

Taking Moscow as one prime German objective and Suez as another, the center is Greece. Axis-held Greece protects Italy on the East; points at Derna on the South; flanks the Dardanelles passage to Russia; and parallels Asia Minor.

This great natural bastion is peopled by a rebellious people. Its coasts are happy hunting grounds for smugglers. Greece is difficult to seal with fixed fortifications.

The German General Haupshoffer and Professor Ewald Banse of the Berlin Institute for Military and Geopolitical Science blame the loss of Germany's World War I on the collapse of the Eastern front. General Sir Archibald Wavell in his book on General Allenby concurs, as does Prime Minister Churchill, in his War Memoirs. General Ludendorf in his "Total War" declares that "Germany must never again permit herself to be threatened from the Balkans . . .." The topography of that region qualifies that region as the natural point for attacking Germany in the rear.

Our eventual invasion of Greece appears indicated because:

1. It will flank Axis Northern attempts against the Suez Canal.
2. It is, geographically, one of the most inviting invasion points.

3. If the Turks believe such an invasion likely, their attitude will be influenced strongly.

4. It is a good base for the invasion of Italy and not a good point for invasion by Italy.

5. It offers a base for operations in Yugoslavia and will help liberate 8,000,000 Greeks and 12,000,000 Yugoslavs, the authors of the most determined continental resistance to Germany and will afford two or more millions of resolute soldiers.

6. It will shorten lines to Russia; establish bases for operations against the puppet nations of Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania.

7. It will enable the Allies to inaugurate echelon operations against the heart of the Axis.

Rebellious Greece

The Greek Government in Exile, in constant communication with Greece reports that their country is in a state of rebellion.

Resistance in centers of population is passive but stubborn. The numbers of outlaws are swelling. The people of Greece will continue and increase resistance so long as their faith in the Allies continues.

Greek instincts for freedom are mighty and are rooted in their remotest past. But hunger and stark despair are potent enemies. The Greek belief in ultimate liberation must be nurtured. The Greek is always ready to believe in a miracle, but his faith needs occasional signs and portents.

The best evidence that the strength of America is gathering is the infiltration of agents, token presents of condensed food, drugs and printed messages.

The guerillas require materiel. The country needs direct communication with the free world so that a liaison may be effected for future more ambitious operations.

A. L.N.